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ABSTRACT
This report provides background information on the implementation of the April 1998 peace
agreement for Northern Ireland.  It reviews the provisions of the agreement, how those
provisions have been put into place, and what obstacles have faced implementation as of
December 2000.  The analysis then turns to related issues of particular interest to U.S.
policymakers, such as police reform, the International Fund for Ireland, and fair employment.
Finally, legislation in the 106th Congress relating to Northern Ireland is listed.  This report will
not be updated.  See also CRS Report 98-542, Northern Ireland:  The Talks Process as
Prelude to the April 1998 Peace Agreement.
Northern Ireland: Implementation of The Peace Agreement
During the 106th Congress
Summary
Since 1969, over 3,200 people have died as a result of political violence in
Northern Ireland.  The conflict has reflected a struggle between different national,
cultural, and religious identities.  The Protestant majority (56%) defines itself as
British and largely supports continued incorporation in the United Kingdom
(unionists); the Catholic minority (42%) considers itself Irish and many Catholics
desire a united Ireland (nationalists).  Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom.
For years, the British and Irish governments sought a formula that would
facilitate a peaceful settlement.  After many ups and downs, the British and Irish
governments and the eight parties participating in peace talks announced agreement
on a political settlement on April 10, 1998.  The Good Friday Agreement includes the
establishment of a Northern Ireland Assembly, a North/South Ministerial Council, and
a British-Irish Council.  It also contains provisions on human rights, decommissioning,
policing, and prisoners.  The agreement recognizes the consent principle, namely,
change in the status of Northern Ireland can only come about with the consent of the
majority of its people.  Voters in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
approved the accord in referendums held on May 22.  Elections to the new Assembly
took place on June 25.  Nonetheless, violence continued to mar the peace process.
For instance, the single worst terrorist incident in Northern Ireland’s history was
carried out by a republican splinter group in August 1998 in Omagh, where a car
bomb killed 29 and wounded 220.
The implementation of the peace agreement has been difficult.  On February 16,
1999, the Assembly approved, with cross-community support, a proposal detailing
new governing arrangements.  However, the Northern Ireland Secretary of State only
transferred powers to Belfast in early December, following a review of the peace
agreement’s implementation, led by George Mitchell.  That review succeeded in
getting unionists to drop their precondition that the IRA had to decommission
weapons prior to Sinn Fein representatives assuming ministerial posts in the
Assembly.  After 27 years of direct rule from London, authority over local affairs was
transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly and its Executive at midnight December
1.  However, in the absence of IRA decommissioning and thus with the Assembly’s
First Minister poised to resign, the British government suspended that power-sharing
government as of midnight February 11, 2000.  Statements by the two governments
on May 5 and the IRA on May 6 resulted in a positive vote by the Ulster Unionists
on May 27 to reinstate the agreement’s institutions.  The executive met on June 1; the
Assembly reconvened on June 5.  In June and again in October 2000, two
international inspectors were given access to several IRA arms dumps.  Difficult
issues, including arms decommissioning and police reform, remain. 
 
The Clinton Administration and many Members of Congress have played an
active role in the peace process.  President Clinton visited the region for the third time
in December 2000.  The United States provides aid to the region through the
International Fund for Ireland ($25 million for FY2001).  The United States is also
an important source of investment for the region.
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Northern Ireland: Implementation of The Peace
Agreement During the 106th Congress
Since 1969, over 3,200 people have died as a result of political violence in
Northern Ireland.  The conflict has reflected a struggle between different national,
cultural, and religious identities.  In a population of roughly 1.6 million, the Protestant
majority (56%) defines itself as British and largely supports continued incorporation
in the United Kingdom (unionists); the Catholic minority (42%) considers itself Irish
and many Catholics desire a united Ireland (nationalists).  Northern Ireland is part of
the United Kingdom.  For years, the British and Irish governments have sought a
formula that would facilitate a peaceful settlement.    They sponsored peace talks,
which began on June 10, 1996, to reach an overall political settlement.  George
Mitchell, the former Senate Majority Leader, served as chairman of the talks.  In July
1997, the IRA announced a restoration of its August 31, 1994 cease-fire, which had
ended on February 9, 1996.  That enabled Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, to
join the seven other parties participating in the talks in the fall of 1997.  The major
Protestant paramilitary groups had called a truce in October 1994.
The Peace Agreement of April 10, 1998
On April 10, 1998, 17 hours after the deadline of midnight April 9 had passed,
the British and Irish governments and the eight parties participating in the talks
announced agreement on a political settlement for Northern Ireland.  Reportedly, key
to agreement were the personal involvement of the British and Irish Prime Ministers,
as well as telephone calls to several of the participants throughout the night from
President Clinton.  The agreement reflects a remarkable achievement because of the
bitterness and staying power of the conflict it seeks to resolve.  However, it represents
only another step, albeit an important one, towards a lasting settlement, rather than
the end of the peace process.  Potential obstacles loom.  For one, most analysts expect
that the splinter paramilitary groups will continue their violence in hopes of derailing
the process.  For another, the implementation of the agreement, which includes
complicated institutional arrangements and somewhat nebulous provisions in places,
is proving challenging.  On October 16, 1998, Northern Ireland’s two major Catholic
and Protestant politicians — John Hume and David Trimble — were awarded the
Nobel peace prize for their roles in helping to conclude the agreement.
Main Elements of the Agreement
Constitutional Issues.  The agreement recognizes the consent principle: namely,
change in the status of Northern Ireland can only come about with the consent of a
majority of its people.  It acknowledges that while a substantial minority in the North
and a majority on the island want a united Ireland, the majority in the North currently
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wants to remain part of the United Kingdom.  If the preferences of these majorities
were to change, both governments have a binding obligation to bring about the wish
of the people.  Provision is made for future polls to be held in Northern Ireland on its
constitutional status.  The agreement calls for the 1920 Government of Ireland Act,
claiming British jurisdiction over all of Ireland, to be repealed; and for the Irish
Government to replace its constitutional claim to the North (Articles 2 and 3) with the
aspiration of Irish unity, recognizing that unity can only occur with the consent of a
majority of people in both jurisdictions.
Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland.  The accord provides for an
108-member Assembly with executive and legislative powers.  To ensure that neither
bloc — unionists or nationalists — can dominate the Assembly, the agreement
specifies that “key decisions” must receive cross-community support represented by
a “weighted majority,” at least 60% of members present and voting in favor, including
at least 40% of the nationalist and unionist “designations” present and voting, or
“parallel consent,” a majority of members representing the unionist and nationalist
“designations” voting in support.  The agreement calls for executive authority to be
discharged by a First Minister, Deputy First Minister, and up to ten Ministers with
departmental responsibilities (i.e., health, education, social services), who together
form the Executive Committee.  As a condition of appointment, all Ministers must
affirm the terms of a Pledge of Office, which includes a commitment to non-violence
and exclusively peaceful and democratic means.  Assembly elections were held on
June 25, 1998.
North/South Institutions.  The agreement calls for creation of a  North/South
Ministerial Council, consisting of those with executive authority in Northern Ireland
and the Irish Republic, to consult, cooperate and act within the island of Ireland on
matters within their competence.  During the transitional period, the agreement
specifies that the Council must identify and agree at least twelve areas for cooperation
and implementation in economic and social areas, including at least six areas where
the mechanism for cooperation will be new Implementation Bodies.  Members of the
Council remain accountable to the Assembly and the Irish Parliament.  The Council
will be supported by a permanent joint Secretariat.
British-Irish Institutions.  The accord states that the British-Irish Council is to
include representatives of the two governments, devolved administrations in Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.  It will promote
consultation and cooperation on matters of mutual interest, such as transport and
culture.  The new British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference replaces the Anglo-Irish
Intergovernmental Conference.  It deals with bilateral issues between the two
governments, with a focus on matters relating to Northern Ireland where
responsibility has not been transferred to the Northern Ireland administration, such as
security, justice, prisons, and policing.  These arrangements are being established
under a new British-Irish Agreement, replacing the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement.
Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity.  The incorporation of the
European Convention on Human Rights into Northern Ireland law will be completed.
The agreement calls for a Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.  Brice
Dickson, a law professor at the University of Ulster, was appointed chief
commissioner, in January 1999, and the five Protestant and five Catholic members of
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1 This deadline was later extended to June 2001.  See section on “Devolution Restored”
on p. 15 of this report.
2 Warren Hoge, “Notorious Killer Among Inmates Freed From Ulster Prison,” New York
Times, July 25, 2000, p. A3; Jim Cusack, “Last IRA prisoners in low security Castlerea,” The
Irish Times, July 24, 2000.
the Commission held their first meeting on March 1 to begin drafting a bill of rights.
The Irish government will take comparable steps to strengthen human rights
protection.  This section also discusses a new economic development strategy for
Northern Ireland, measures on employment equality, and  promotion of the Irish
language, where appropriate and desired.  Members of the Equality Commission were
announced on July 22, 1999.
Decommissioning.  All parties committed themselves to work with the
Decommissioning Commission for total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations
within two years, by May 2000.1  The British government is committed to reducing
the numbers and role of the security forces.
Policing, Justice, and Prisoners.  As called for in the agreement, an
independent commission was established to make recommendations for future
policing arrangements in the North by summer 1999.  That commission released its
report on September 9, 1999.  The British Government is carrying out a review of the
Northern Ireland criminal justice system.  Both governments put in place mechanisms
to provide for an accelerated program of prisoner releases with the intention of
releasing all qualifying prisoners (a total of roughly 400) within two years.  All
prisoners were released by the end of July 2000.2
The Referendums of May 22, 1998
On May 22, 1998, voters in the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland endorsed the
peace agreement.  In the Republic of Ireland, 94.4% of those voting backed the plan
with a turnout of 56.3%.  In Northern Ireland, with the largest turnout ever of 81%
of eligible voters, the approval rating reached 71.1%.  The ballots in Northern Ireland
were all brought to a central location for counting and thus a breakdown by
constituency was not possible.  However, exit polling suggested that Catholics voted
for the accord by a margin of 96 to 4 and Protestants by a margin of 55 to 45.  The
leaders of the “No” campaign, the Rev. Ian Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) and Robert McCartney of the U.K. Unionist Party, argued that the agreement
would result in more violence and undermine the status of the pro-British majority in
Northern Ireland.  David Trimble’s Ulster Unionist parliamentary group was split,
with six of its 10 Members of Parliament openly opposing the agreement.  Prime
Minister Blair visited Northern Ireland three times in the three weeks preceding the
vote to try to shore up unionist support.
The Assembly Election of June 25, 1998
On June 25, 1998, voters in Northern Ireland went to the polls to elect 108
members of the new Assembly.  The UUP won 28 seats; the SDLP, 24; the DUP, 20;
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Political Parties in Northern Ireland
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP):  largest political
party enjoys support of most Protestants and
favors union with the U.K.  Received about 33%
in May 1997 election; 10 seats in House of
Commons.  Party leader is David Trimble.
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP):  smaller
Protestant party favors union with the U.K.  Less
flexible than the UUP, it views virtually any
compromise with Irish nationalists as a net loss for
unionists.  Received about 14% in 1997 election; 2
seats in House of Commons.  Party leader is the
Rev. Dr. Ian Paisley.
Alliance Party:  non-sectarian and largely middle
class, it garners 60% of its support from
Protestants, 40% from Catholics.  Received
roughly 8% in 1997 election; no seats in House of
Commons.  Party leader is Sean Neeson.
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP): 
major Catholic party supports a united Ireland
achieved by consent.  Received about 24% in 1997
election; 3 seats in House of Commons.  Party
leader is John Hume.
Sinn Fein:  political wing of the Provisional Irish
Republican Army.  Supports creation of socialist
republic in a united Ireland.  Strongholds are
heavily working class, Catholic neighborhoods. 
Received 16.1% in 1997 election, 2 seats in House
of Commons.  Leader is Gerry Adams.
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and Ulster
Democratic Party (UDP):  political wings of
loyalist paramilitary groups.  Extremely small.
Sinn Fein, 18; Alliance, 6; U.K.
Unionists, 5; independent
Unionists, 3; the Women’s
Coalition, 2; and the PUP, 2.  As
spelled out in the agreement, “the
Assembly will exercise full
legislative and executive and
executive authority in respect of
those matters currently within the
responsibility of the six Northern
I r e l a n d  G o v e r n m e n t
Departments, with the possibility
of taking on responsibility for
other matters as detailed
elsewhere in this agreement.”  
Responsibility for law and order
(policing, the British army,
prisons, and the justice system)
will remain with the Secretary of





marches are held throughout
Northern Ireland every summer,
the vast majority (90%) by
Protestants.  Controversy has
been sparked by Protestant
marches which traverse Catholic
neighborhoods.  Protestants claim
the right to march; Catholics
claim the right to live free of
disruption and apparent
intimidation.  In February 1998, a
Parades Commission was
established and given the power
(that had rested with the police)
to re-route or restrict marches.
July is the high point of the marching season when the Protestant marching
orders commemorate the Battle of the Boyne of 1690, in which Protestant King
William III of Orange defeated Catholic King James II.  The most contentious march
in recent years has been the Drumcree march of the Orange Order in Portadown in
David Trimble’s constituency.  The Parades Commission decided to re-route the
Drumcree parade scheduled for July 5, 1998.  Substantial violence accompanied the
march, including a fire bomb attack by dissident loyalists that left three Catholic boys
dead.  Rioting in Portadown on September 6, 1998, resulted in the death of a
policeman from a blast bomb thrown by loyalist protesters.
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3 “A new route,” The Economist, July 15, 2000, p. 55; Gerry Moriarty, “Orange Order
badly needs a new tune,” The Irish Times, July 13, 2000.
In the run-up to the 1999 marching season, many initiatives were launched to try
to reach compromise on the Drumcree march.  For example, Prime Minister Blair met
several times with representatives of the Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition and
Orange Order, but was unable to resolve the impasse.  For the second time, the
Parades Commission ruled on June 28 that the Orangemen could not march through
the Catholic neighborhood.  The Government increased the number of troops in
Northern Ireland to 17,000 and mounted a tight security operation in Portadown.  On
July 4, the Orange Order scaled down its procession from Drumcree Church to the
concrete barrier to a symbolic delegation of nine men and violence was averted.
Reportedly, Blair had told the Orangemen that they would be permitted to complete
their traditional parade in future if peace prevailed.  Orange Order parades to
commemorate the Battle of the Boyne were held throughout Northern Ireland without
major incident on July 12, in what was described as the quietest Twelfth of recent
years.
The Parades Commission, on July 3, 2000, again decided to reroute the
Drumcree parade, scheduled for July 9, around the Garvaghy Road.  The Commission
suggested a future march could be held in 3-8 months if the Orange Order agreed to
talk directly with the Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition.  The decision sparked
about 10 days of protest and violence by loyalists.  However, most observers
commented that fewer protesters turned out than in previous years and that the
protests were more disorderly and less politically respectable than in the past.
Mainstream unionists, such as David Trimble, and even hardliners, such as the
Reverend Ian Paisley, kept their distance from Drumcree.  Some senior Orange Order
members warned that the violence attending the Drumcree protest was proving
counterproductive.3
Violent Splinter Groups
The major paramilitary groups (the Irish Republican Army and the Combined
Loyalist Military Command) are observing cease-fires, but some splinter groups
continue to carry out  acts of violence.
Real IRA.  Real IRA formed in early May 1998, consisting of a small number
of IRA hard-liners.  Reportedly, the Real IRA is the military wing of the “32-County
Sovereignty Committee” which formed in December 1997 to oppose what it termed
the IRA “sell-out” in the peace talks.  The Real IRA carried out several attacks during
the summer of 1998.  The most serious was a car bomb that exploded in the town of
Omagh on August 15, killing 29 and wounding 220 — representing the largest loss
of life in a single terrorist incident in the history of Northern Ireland.  The Real IRA
claimed responsibility and simultaneously announced a suspension of all military
operations on August 19.  For the first time, Gerry Adams “condemned” an act of
republican violence “without equivocation.”   In the aftermath of the bombing, the
Irish and British passed harsh anti-terrorism legislation.  The Real IRA announced a
“complete” cease-fire on September 8, 1998.  However, the Real IRA has been
CRS-6
4 Robert Shrimsley and Astrid Wendlandt, “Bomb scare disrupts royal parade,”
Financial Times, July 20, 2000, p. 11.
blamed for a bomb planted near a west London railway station on July 19, 2000, the
day of the royal parade to mark the Queen Mother’s 100th birthday.4
Continuity IRA.    The only republican paramilitary group not on cease-fire is
the Continuity IRA.  According to the Irish Times, the group is the paramilitary wing
of Republican Sinn Fein, the party which broke from Sinn Fein in 1986.  The
Continuity IRA has existed since about 1991 and has carried out several attacks in
Northern Ireland, particularly in County Fermanagh, but has never killed anyone.
Members of the group are believed to have close links with the Real IRA, the group
responsible for the Omagh bombing.  The Continuity IRA claimed responsibility for
a bomb attack on a hotel in Co. Fermanagh on February 6, 2000 and, most recently,
for a small bomb explosion on a west London bridge on June 1.
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF).  On the loyalist side, the LVF was responsible
for violent acts in the first four months of 1998.  On April 15, the LVF announced an
unequivocal cease-fire, while continuing to oppose the peace agreement.  Some
analysts believe that the LVF  move was precipitated by the desire to meet the
condition of the peace agreement that only paramilitary prisoners affiliated with
groups respecting cease-fires would be eligible for early release.  On November 12,
1998, then Northern Ireland Secretary of State Mowlam said she was satisfied that
the LVF had “established a complete and unequivocal ceasefire.”  On December 18,
the LVF surrendered a cache of weapons, thus becoming the only paramilitary group
in Northern Ireland to start dismantling its arsenal.  Nonetheless, The Irish Times
reported that Portadown LVF members threw a pipe bomb that killed a Protestant
woman married to a Catholic on June 5, 1999.
Red Hand Defenders.  The Red Hand Defenders, a splinter group of the LVF,
claimed responsibility for the random sectarian murder of Brian Service, a Catholic,
in north Belfast on October 31, 1998.  The leader of this relatively unknown group
is reported to be a highly unstable figure bent on wrecking the peace process (Irish
Times, 11/3/98).  Former Northern Ireland Secretary of State Mowlam outlawed the
Red Hand Defenders in March 1999.
A car bomb killed Rosemary Nelson, a leading human rights lawyer in Northern
Ireland, on March 15, 1999.  The Red Hand Defenders claimed responsibility.
Nelson’s murder sparked nationalist rioting in Portadown on March 17, in which 38
police officers were injured, and on March 18, when 170 petrol bombs were thrown
at the police.  In response to claims of police collusion in her killing, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC) announced that the chief of police of Kent would supervise the
Nelson murder investigation, with assistance from the FBI; the FBI’s involvement
ended on April 12.  Colin Port, Deputy Chief Constable of Norfolk, was appointed
on March 30 to assume control of the investigation.  Republicans and human rights
campaigners have called for an investigation conducted entirely by outside agencies.
The House of Representatives passed a resolution on April 20 calling, among other
things, on Britain to “launch an independent public inquiry” into Nelson’s murder.  On
July 21, the House approved the American Embassy Security Act (H.R. 2415) with
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a provision calling for a halt to training exchanges between the FBI and the RUC until
the President “certifies that complete, independent, credible and transparent
investigations of the murders of defense attorneys Rosemary Nelson and Patrick
Finucane have been initiated” and “appropriate steps to protect defense attorneys
against RUC harassment” have been taken.  Nelson had testified before the
International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee of the House International
Relations Committee on September 29, 1998, about RUC harassment and intimidation
she had faced as a defense attorney.
Orange Volunteers.  The Orange Volunteers represent a further splintering on
the loyalist side.  The group emerged in late November 1998, announcing it would
target republicans released early from prison under the peace agreement.  The Orange
Volunteers claimed responsibility for an attempt to kill a leading IRA member with
a bomb on December 16; no one was hurt by the explosion.  The group carried out
several gun and bomb attacks in the first two months of 1999.
Implementation of the Agreement
The Northern Ireland Act 1998, which provides for devolution of powers from
Westminster to the Northern Ireland Assembly and for the creation of  the new bodies
called for in the peace agreement, came into force on November 19, 1998.  However,
devolution itself did not follow promptly.  Many observers argue that the
implementation of the peace agreement is proving to be as difficult as its negotiation.
 On July 1, 1998, the Assembly held its first meeting in “shadow” mode, as
devolution had not occurred.  David Trimble, UUP leader, was elected First Minister
and the SDLP’s Seamus Mallon, Deputy First Minister.  Because of the deep division
among unionists over support for the peace agreement, Trimble’s role is a difficult
one.  As First Minister, Trimble called together the leaders of the Assembly for a
preliminary meeting on September 7, at which he spoke directly to Gerry Adams for
the first time.  The two men held their first one-on-one meeting on September 10;
Sinn Fein and the UUP held their first inter-party meeting on February 17, 1999.
Decommissioning: Background
A key unionist concern throughout the peace process has been the issue of
decommissioning or surrender of paramilitary weapons.  The text of the peace
agreement states: “Those who hold office should use only democratic, non-violent
means, and those who do not should be excluded or removed from office.”  Further,
all participants reaffirmed “their commitment to the total disarmament of all
paramilitary organisations,” and their intention “ to use any influence they may have
to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years.”  Unionists
sought and received assurances from Prime Minister Blair on these points in the run-
up to the referendum.
On June 29, 1998, the two governments brought into force procedures to
facilitate the decommissioning of paramilitary arms, as called for in the peace
agreement, when British and Irish Ministers signed the proposals of the Independent
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Commission on Decommissioning into being.  The plan sets forth two possible
methods of decommissioning: (1) the provision of information to the Commission,
leading to the collection and destruction of arms; and (2) the destruction of arms by
those who possess them.
On August 31, 1998, the IRA released a rare public statement denying any
involvement in the August 15 bombing in Omagh.  The IRA also rejected calls both
for handing over weapons and for stating categorically that the war is over.  Sinn
Fein’s Gerry Adams then held out two olive branches to unionist politicians.  First,
on September 1, Adams stated that “the violence we have seen must be for all of us
now a thing of the past, over, done with and gone.”  The next day he announced that
Sinn Fein’s chief negotiator, Martin McGuinness, would serve as liaison to the
Independent Commission on Decommissioning.  Some observers argue the Omagh
bombing dramatized the reason why the IRA should support handing over weapons,
namely to keep them out of the hands of dissident republicans.  The IRA has said
repeatedly it has no intention of handing in any weapons.
The Assembly’s Executive.  Decommissioning became a key sticking point in
the implementation of the agreement because unionists argued that Sinn Fein could
not assume ministerial posts in the Assembly, thereby entering into a relationship of
collective executive responsibility with unionist Ministers, until the IRA had
surrendered some weapons.  Sinn Fein argued that Trimble was attempting to rewrite
the peace agreement given that it includes no start date for decommissioning.  Based
on its representation in the Assembly, Sinn Fein was entitled to two ministerial posts
on the Executive Committee, which was designed to exercise executive authority on
behalf of the Assembly.  On May 10, 1999, Sinn Fein announced its chief negotiator,
Martin McGuinness, and another party official, Bairbre de Brun, would be its
nominees for those positions. 
North-South Ministerial Council.  The stalemate over decommissioning and
setting up the Executive Committee also affected establishment of the North/South
Ministerial Council.  Under the peace accord, agreement was to have been reached
by October 31, 1998, on the topics to be covered by the new north-south
administrative bodies.  This deadline was missed.  In coordination with the Blair
government, Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern went to Belfast on November 2 and
sought to put the issues of decommissioning and forming a shadow executive to one
side and attempted to “kick-start” the process by working to form the North-South
implementation bodies.  Ahern was concerned that a political vacuum not develop.
Tony Blair visited Dublin on November 25-26, the first official visit by a British Prime
Minister to the Republic.
On December 18, 1998, agreement was reached on North-South bodies and the
structure of departments within the proposed executive.  Regarding North-South
cooperation, the peace agreement called for a work program on at least 12 matters,
with six areas being handled by new implementation bodies and six being matters for
cooperation.  The six implementation bodies cover inland waterways, food safety,
trade and business development, special European Union programs, language, and
aquaculture and marine matters.  The six areas for cooperation include transport,
agriculture, education, health, environment, and tourism.  The First Minister and
Deputy First Minister also announced agreement on the creation of new departments.
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Their office would handle economic policy and equality issues.  The ten departments,
headed by ministers comprising the Executive Committee, would be:  agriculture and
rural development; environment; regional development; social development;
education; higher and further education, training, and employment; enterprise, trade
and investment; culture, arts and leisure; health, social services and public safety;
finance and personnel.
The Path to Devolution
On February 16, 1999, the Northern Ireland Assembly approved, with cross-
community support, the December 18 proposal detailing new governing
arrangements, including the structure of departments within the Assembly’s executive
and North-South bodies.  On March 8, then Northern Ireland Secretary of State
Mowlam and Irish Foreign Minister Andrews signed four treaties to pave the way for
the establishment of the six North-South Implementation Bodies, a North-South
Ministerial Council, a British-Irish council, and a British-Irish Intergovernmental
Conference.  Mowlam announced the postponement of plans to devolve powers to
Northern Ireland on March 10, setting the week of March 29 as a “natural deadline”
as it marked the first anniversary of the peace agreement; the extension came in
response to the impasse created by the refusal of the unionists to sit in an Assembly
executive with Sinn Fein ministers in the absence of prior IRA weapons
decommissioning.  When the Northern Ireland Secretary activates the transfer, several
events occur simultaneously: powers would be transferred to Northern Ireland
ministers and the Assembly; the British-Irish Agreement would come into force; Irish
and British constitutional changes outlined in the peace agreement would take effect;
the North-South Ministerial Council, the British-Irish Council, and the British-Irish
Intergovernmental Conference would be established; and the six North-South
implementation bodies would come into being.
  
The end of March brought two days of intensive negotiations among the Prime
Minister, the Taoiseach, and the political parties.  A compromise on decommissioning
could not be found, however.  Mowlam postponed the transfer of powers indefinitely.
On April 1, the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach announced the Hillsborough
Declaration in an attempt to move the process forward.  The key elements were:
Ministers would be nominated on a date to be set, and not later than one month
thereafter, there would be a “collective act of reconciliation” which would put some
arms beyond use, on a voluntary basis, in a manner to be verified by the Independent
Commission on Decommissioning.  At the same time, there would be ceremonies of
remembrance of all victims of violence, and further reductions of British troops.
Around the time of the “act of reconciliation,” powers would be devolved and the
new institutions established.  After an Easter break for “reflection,” Northern Ireland
politicians resumed negotiations on April 13, at which point Sinn Fein formally
rejected the Hillsborough Declaration.  Shortly thereafter, SDLP leader John Hume
suggested that the administration could be set up without any handover of weapons
by the IRA if Sinn Fein gave assurances that it would exclude itself from office if the
IRA resorted to violence.  UUP leader Trimble dismissed Hume’s initiative on April
26.
On May 14, the two governments, the UUP, the SDLP, and Sinn Fein reportedly
prepared a document including the following key section: “All parties agree to the full
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implementation of all aspects of the Good Friday agreement including the objective
of achieving total disarmament and complete withdrawal of all weapons from politics
in Ireland.  They accept the issue of arms must be finally and satisfactorily settled and
will do what they can to achieve decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within the
time frame set down in the agreement, in the context of the implementation of the
overall settlement.  The International Commission on Decommissioning will now
begin a period of intensive discussions with all parties and report back on progress
before 30th June.  All parties anticipate, without prejudice to their clear positions on
this issue, a devolution of powers by 30th June.”  The draft was considered at a
meeting of the Ulster Unionist Assembly team on May 15 and the UUP rejected the
document.  For unionists, who state their position as “no guns, no government,” the
draft’s commitment to work for decommissioning was too vague.  Unionists had
softened their stance at Hillsborough when they indicated a willingness to agree to the
designation of ministerial posts before an arms handover, provided there would be no
formal transfer of powers prior to decommissioning.  The Downing Street draft
document would have required a further concession from unionists: the willingness
to form an executive on the basis of a progress report on decommissioning from the
Commission’s chairman, General de Chastelain; progress that, in all probability, would
not include the handover of any weapons.  Following the UUP’s failure to approve
the draft, Prime Minister Blair, later on May 15, set an “absolute” deadline of June 30,
1999, for the devolution of power.  
The week of June 28 found the British and Irish Prime Ministers in tough
negotiations with Northern Ireland’s political party leaders; those talks continued
beyond the June 30 deadline.  On July 1, Sinn Fein released a statement, saying “we
believe that all of us...could succeed in persuading those with arms to decommission
them....”  On July 2, General de Chastelain released the report of the
Decommissioning Commission saying the Commission “expects that Sinn Fein’s
proposal will be endorsed by the IRA and reciprocated by loyalist and other
republican paramilitary groups,” and believes “that decommissioning can be
completed in the time prescribed by the Good Friday Agreement.”  Later that day in
Belfast, Blair and Ahern launched a new plan, “The Way Forward,” which called for
the Assembly’s executive to be formed on July 15, with power being devolved from
London to Belfast three days later.  That would have been followed shortly afterwards
by a start to the decommissioning of terrorist weapons to be overseen by the
Decommissioning Commission.  The government’s plan set no date for
decommissioning to begin, but de Chastelain said the process should start within days
of devolution with the IRA clearly and unambiguously stating its intent to disarm,
with the actual destruction of weapons taking place within weeks.
Sinn Fein welcomed “The Way Forward,” while unionists called it fundamentally
unfair, forcing them to sit in an executive with Sinn Fein prior to IRA disarmament.
However, unionist attention focused less on the issue of sequencing and more on what
watertight safeguards would be legislated to expel Sinn Fein from the executive if IRA
arms were not handed over.  In that event, the UUP did not want the Assembly
suspended, but rather wanted any sanction to be applied exclusively to Sinn Fein,
allowing the UUP to form an executive with the other parties.  British Prime Minister
Blair effectively embraced this UUP stance on July 5 when he addressed the House
of Commons, saying a “defaulting party” could be excluded from the executive and
the other parties could form a government on their own.  However, the Taoiseach
CRS-11
5 T. R. Reid, “Unionists Reject N. Ireland Proposal,” Washington Post, July 15, 1999,
pp. A1, A22; T. R. Reid, “N. Ireland’s Political Hopes Dissolve Amid Tears, Taunts,”
Washington Post, July 16, 1999, pp. Al, A19. 
6 Clare Murphy, “Mitchell to return North as facilitator of review,” The Irish Times,
July 21, 1999.
7 Tom Buerkle, “Mandelson Takes U.K.’s Top Ulster Job,” International Herald
Tribune, Oct. 12, 1999, pp. 1, 4; John Murray Brown, “Prince across the water,” Financial
Times, Oct. 12, 1999, p. 17.
indicated his government would oppose moves to exclude Sinn Fein.  On July 8,
Ahern contended that Sinn Fein and the IRA were “two separate organizations,”
while  Blair stated that the two organizations were “inextricably linked.”  A major
premise of The Way Forward was that Sinn Fein would convince the IRA to hand
over weapons.  The Irish government expressed some hope that the IRA would issue
a statement indicating its response to The Way Forward.  On July 14, following a 15-
minute meeting of the 110-member UUP executive, David Trimble rejected the
proposal.  The UUP then boycotted the Assembly session on July 15, at which the
SDLP and Sinn Fein named ministers to an Assembly executive, but the ministerial
appointments were invalid as all came from the nationalist side.  Seamus Mallon
resigned as Deputy First Minister.  Former Northern Ireland Secretary Mowlam made
an emergency statement announcing a review of the implementation of the Belfast
Agreement.5  
After meeting with the two prime ministers on July 20 in London, former talks
chairman George Mitchell agreed to act as a facilitator once the review recommenced
in September.6  The IRA released a statement on July 21 rejecting demands for
decommissioning “in the current political context,” but underlining its “definitive
commitment” to the success of the peace process.  Then Northern Ireland Secretary
Mowlam called the statement “unhelpful,” whereas nationalists emphasized that it did
not rule out decommissioning.  In opening the review on September 6, Mitchell said
his role would be strictly limited to carrying out three principles agreed in July — that
a governing executive is formed including all parties; that those parties are committed
to achieving full paramilitary decommissioning by May 2000; and that the means of
decommissioning is left to the independent international commission headed by
General de Chastelain.  British Prime Minister Blair appointed Peter Mandelson, one
of Blair’s closest political advisers, to replace Mo Mowlam as Northern Ireland
Secretary on October 11.  The move revived the career of Mandelson, who had
resigned as trade minister ten months earlier over a financial scandal, and offered hope
of an impetus to the peace process.7  Mitchell met with the Irish Prime Minister, the
British Prime Minister, and President Clinton during the week of November 1.  He
resumed his meetings with the parties in Belfast on November 8, as the review entered
its tenth week.  The review was conducted in tight secrecy and on some occasions
outside of Belfast.
Devolution
The review of the peace agreement’s implementation, led by George Mitchell,
succeeded in breaking the deadlock.  Beginning November 9, 1999, Mitchell
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orchestrated a series of carefully planned statements and actions, all intended to help
build the political confidence necessary to enable the parties to take the risks required
for peace.  Mitchell issued a statement, in which, for the first time, he expressed
confidence that the impasse could be overcome; the Independent Commission on
Decommissioning asserted a more active role; the pro-agreement parties, including
Sinn Fein and the Ulster Unionists, the largest Protestant party, made conciliatory
statements; and the IRA announced that it would appoint a representative to meet
with the decommissioning commission.8
On November 27, the ruling council of the Ulster Unionists (UUP) voted to drop
its insistence on IRA disarmament before entering executive government with Sinn
Fein.  UUP leader David Trimble, who is First Minister of the Northern Ireland
Assembly, secured the support of 58% of the council for this position by promising
to reconvene it in February to reevaluate the IRA stance on decommissioning.  If the
party council were to deem progress inadequate, Trimble and his three Ulster Unionist
ministers pledged to resign from the power-sharing executive.9  Sinn Fein officials
complained about what they interpreted as a new pressure tactic and said the implied
deadline would make the job of having the IRA abandon its arms more difficult.
On November 29, the political parties nominated ministers for the new Assembly
executive, effectively Northern Ireland’s cabinet.  Under the power-sharing formula,
Trimble is First Minister, and Seamus Mallon of the Social Democratic and Labor
Party (SDLP), the largest Catholic party, is his deputy.  The 10 other cabinet seats are
apportioned as follows: three to the UUP, three to the SDLP, and two each to Sinn
Fein and the Democratic Unionists (DUP).  Thus, the executive includes all the main
parties and political traditions in Northern Ireland.  The DUP opposes the peace
agreement and says its participation in the Assembly is solely to offer a dogged
opposition.  The British Government’s order devolving powers to the new institutions
– the Assembly, the Executive, and the North/South bodies – was tabled in the House
of Commons on November 30, passed and signed into effect by the Queen on
December 1.  Authority over local affairs was transferred from London to the new
Northern Ireland Assembly at midnight December 1.  The Assembly held its first
session as a fully empowered legislature on December 2.  Northern Ireland had been
governed directly from London since 1972; the Northern Ireland Secretary of State,
Peter Mandelson, retains control over “reserved” matters including policing, parades,
prisons, and the criminal justice system.10 
Several other things happened on December 2, 1999.  For one, the IRA
appointed a representative to meet with the Decommissioning Commission.  For
another, Northern Ireland Secretary Mandelson and Irish Foreign Affairs Minister
Andrews signed a new British-Irish Agreement in Dublin to replace the Anglo-Irish
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Agreement of 1985.  This ceremony was immediately followed by Irish Prime
Minister Ahern’s signing the act officially amending Articles 2 and 3 of the
Constitution, deleting the territorial claim on the North.
On December 13, the full Cabinet from Dublin and 10 of the 12 ministers from
the Northern Ireland Assembly’s executive attended the inaugural meeting of the
North-South Ministerial Council in Armagh.  The two DUP ministers refused to take
part.  The council allows ministers from North and South to meet regularly, both on
a plenary and one-to-one basis, for consultation, cooperation and action on matters
of mutual interest throughout the island.11  On December 17, 1999, the inaugural
session of the British-Irish Council convened in London.
From Devolution to Suspension
The issue of decommissioning continued to be a serious obstacle to the
implementation of the peace agreement.  First Minister Trimble only succeeded in
deferring the issue when his party council met in November 1999 with his pledge to
resign if progress on decommissioning proved inadequate.  Dublin and London
received General John de Chastelain’s report on decommissioning by the deadline of
midnight January 31, 2000.  That report was not made public, but, according to
Northern Ireland Secretary of State Peter Mandelson, it confirmed the IRA’s failure
to begin turning over its weapons.  On February 1, the IRA issued a statement
reviewing its “good faith” engagement with the Decommissioning Commission, and
referring to three meetings between the Commission and an IRA representative: “Our
representative stressed that we are totally committed to the peace process, that the
IRA wants a permanent peace, that the declaration and maintenance of the cessation,
which is now entering its fifth year, is evidence of that, that the IRA’s guns are silent
and that there is no threat to the peace process from the IRA.”
Given the absence of IRA decommissioning, First Minister Trimble was widely
expected to submit his letter of resignation on February 4.  In a bid to preempt that
resignation, Northern Ireland Secretary of State Mandelson addressed the House of
Commons on February 3.  Mandelson said he would introduce legislation that would
enable him to suspend the institutions of the peace agreement and reinstate direct rule
by February 11.  He effectively gave the IRA one week to clarify if and when it would
decommission its arms.  Mandelson’s emphasis on the IRA indicating its intention to
comply with the May decommissioning deadline set out in the peace  agreement
seemed at odds with First Minister Trimble’s demand for an actual IRA “product.”
However, the statement did allow Trimble to put his resignation on hold.  
On February 5, the IRA rejected accusations that it had broken any commitments
regarding decommissioning: “The IRA believes this crisis can be averted and the issue
of the arms can be resolved.  This will not be on British or unionist terms, nor will it
be advanced by British legislative threats.  We recognize that the issue of arms needs
to be dealt with in an acceptable way and this is a necessary objective of a genuine
peace process.  For that reason, we support efforts to secure the resolution of the
arms issue.  The peace process is under no threat from the IRA.”  On February 7,
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SDLP leader John Hume called on the IRA to strengthen the peace process by
undertaking one act of decommissioning.12  The Continuity IRA, the only republican
paramilitary group not on cease-fire, sought to further disrupt the peace process by
setting off a bomb at a hotel in Northern Ireland on February 6; nobody was injured.13
On February 11, 2000, Northern Ireland Secretary Mandelson signed an order
bringing into effect the legislation to suspend the Northern Ireland Assembly and
Executive as of midnight that night.14  On the same day, the Decommissioning
Commission (IICD) published another report, revealing “the assertion made to us by
the IRA representative that the IRA will consider how to put arms and explosives
beyond use, in the context of the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement,
and in the context of the removal of the causes of the conflict....The representative
indicated to us today the context in which the IRA will initiate a comprehensive
process to put arms beyond use, in a manner as to ensure maximum public confidence.
The Commission believes that this commitment, on the basis described above, holds
out the real prospect of an agreement which would enable it to fulfill the substance
of its mandate.” 
These two events – the suspension of the political institutions of the Good Friday
Agreement and the movement, if somewhat cryptic, of the IRA on decommissioning
– set the stage for another impasse in implementing the peace agreement.  The
question no one seemed able to answer was if the institutions were suspended because
no decommissioning had taken place, how could they be reinstated in its continued
absence.
The IRA issued a statement on February 15, saying that “the British Secretary
of State has reintroduced the unionist veto by suspending the political institutions.
This has changed the context in which we appointed a representative to meet with the
IICD and has created a deeper crisis....In the light of these changed circumstances the
leadership of the IRA have decided to end our engagement with the IICD.  We are
also withdrawing all propositions put to the IICD by our representative since
November.”  Sinn Fein also opposed the suspension.  Martin McGuinness, who had
been education minister prior to the Executive’s suspension, said on Feb. 16 that “this
crisis needs to be resolved and it can only be resolved by the reestablishment of the
institutions which were illegally dismantled last Friday.”  He went on to accuse the
British government of siding with the unionists.
British officials argue they had no choice but to suspend the political institutions
established by the peace agreement.  The reasoning went that, had Mandelson not
acted, UUP leader Trimble would have resigned.  The fear was that he would have
been replaced as party leader by someone much less supportive, if not opposed, to the
CRS-15
Good Friday Agreement, a prospect the British government viewed as carrying more
serious and longer term consequences than suspension.  The Ulster Unionists believed
that they “jumped first” in November 1999 and that the IRA failed to follow suit by
carrying out any act of decommissioning.  They appeared to believe that the
institutions ought to remain suspended until there was some concrete progress on
decommissioning.
The Irish government disagreed with the British government’s unilateral decision
to suspend the institutions, particularly in light of the IRA movement on February 11
and the Decommissioning Commission’s report on those developments.
  
Devolution Restored
The British and Irish governments, together with the political parties, were faced
with the task of trying to square the circle of decommissioning and devolution.  UUP
leader, David Trimble, was in Washington for St. Patrick’s Day celebrations when he
said he could accommodate Sinn Fein’s reentry into government prior to IRA
decommissioning if firm guarantees were in place that decommissioning would follow.
Anti-agreement unionists immediately criticized what they saw as an unacceptable
concession on Trimble’s part and the Rev. Martin Smyth, a party hardliner, decided
to challenge Trimble for the leadership at the March 25 annual general meeting of the
Ulster Unionist Council.  The 860 delegates reelected Trimble as party leader with
57% of the vote, but Smyth polled strongly with 43%.  The strength of the anti-
Trimble vote surprised most and seemed further evidence of the split in the party over
implementing the peace agreement.  Trimble’s opportunity for political maneuver
appeared to be further limited by the passing of a motion linking any resumption of
the Assembly’s executive to the retention of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)
title in the name of a reformed police service.  On April 12, Queen Elizabeth went to
Northern Ireland to present the RUC with Britain’s highest civilian gallantry award,
the George Cross, an event denounced by Sinn Fein.
 In seeking to reestablish momentum, the two governments issued a joint
statement on May 5, 2000.  They stated, among other things, that (1) the full
implementation of the agreement could be achieved by June 2001, (2) the British
government was prepared to restore the Assembly and Executive subject to a positive
response to the statement, and (3) the paramilitary groups needed to “urgently state
that they will put their arms completely and verifiably beyond use.”  On May 6, the
governments sent a letter to the Northern Ireland parties setting out their proposals
for securing full implementation of the agreement by June 2001.  The letter covered:
rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity; security; policing and justice; and
prisoners.  The IRA issued a statement on May 6 saying that, with the full
implementation of the agreement, “the IRA leadership will initiate a process that will
completely and verifiably put IRA arms beyond use...the IRA leadership has agreed
to put in place within weeks a confidence-building measure to confirm that our
weapons remain secure.  The contents of a number of our arms dumps will be
inspected by agreed third parties who will report that they have done so to the
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning.  The dumps will be re-
inspected regularly to ensure that the weapons have remained silent.”  Many analysts
viewed this IRA statement as an historic compromise.  The two prime ministers
welcomed the move and announced that Martii Ahtisaari, the former Finnish
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President, and Cyril Ramaphosa, the former secretary general of the African National
Congress in South Africa, would carry out the third-party inspection of IRA weapons
dumps.  On May 9, RUC Chief Constable Flanagan announced a scaling down of the
British army presence in Northern Ireland, including the planned demolition of two
structures in south Armagh, marking the first tangible response from the British
government to the IRA pledge to verifiably put its arms beyond use.15
David Trimble said on May 12 that his party would consider the IRA statement
and decide on May 20 whether it provided a sufficient basis for the UUP to go back
into government with Sinn Fein.  On May 18, Trimble announced his support for a
return to governing with Sinn Fein, but said his party needed an additional week to
review the IRA statement.  Had the vote gone forward, the Irish Times reported that
Trimble could have lost by a margin of 70 to 30.  In the end, Trimble scored a narrow
victory by postponing the vote.  On May 27, the party’s ruling council voted by 459
to 403 (53% to 47%) to return to government with Sinn Fein.  Shortly after the vote,
Northern Ireland Secretary Mandelson signed the order to restore home rule.16  The
executive reconvened on June 1; the Northern Ireland Assembly on June 5.
On June 26, 2000, Ramaphosa and Ahtisaari, the two international inspectors,
reported to the British and Irish Prime Ministers that they had been given access to
several IRA arms dumps which contained “a substantial amount of military material,”
safely stored.  They said they would reinspect regularly and were certain arms could
not be used between visits without detection.17  The two inspectors revisited the arms
dumps in October.  In June, the IRA also resumed contact with General de
Chastelain’s International Decommissioning Commission, but the Commission said
on October 26 that it had not been able to engage with the IRA representative since
the reopening of contact in June.
On October 28, the ruling body of the Ulster Unionist Party met to discuss its
continued participation in the devolved government.  Jeffrey Donaldson, one of David
Trimble’s main critics, drafted a resolution stipulating that if actual decommissioning
had not taken place by November 30, 2000, the UUP would withdraw from the
Belfast Executive.  Trimble strongly opposed that resolution, producing an alternative
calling for continued participation in the Executive, but sanctioning Sinn Fein’s
participation in the North-South Ministerial Council meetings until the IRA engaged
with the Decommissioning Commission.  Trimble also proposed a more pro-active
role for the Commission, suggesting it set targets and issue monthly reports.  The
UUP passed Trimble’s resolution by a narrow margin of 54% to 46%.18
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The IRA issued a statement on December 6, saying it remained “prepared to
initiate a process which would completely and verifiably put IRA arms beyond use.”
However, the statement maintained that the next step lay with the British: “The
British government’s approach to demilitarization and their refusal to address the
Good Friday Agreement’s requirements for a new beginning to policing and other
matters represents a failure by them to honor their commitments.  The political
responsibility for advancing the current situation clearly lies with Tony Blair who must
honor all commitments.”19  British officials argued these accusations were untrue,
pointing to the release of paramilitary prisoners, the closing of 31 security bases, the
lowest level of British troops since 1970, and the passage of the Police (Northern
Ireland) Act.
On December 22, 2000, the Decommissioning Commission issued a report in
which it stated that “it is crucial that we have substantive engagement with the IRA
representative as soon as possible, followed by early movement on actual
decommissioning by each of the paramilitary groups, if we are to meet the
Agreement’s decommissioning requirements by the beginning of June.”  In its New
Year’s statement on January 1, 200l, the IRA again placed the onus on Prime Minister
Blair for overcoming the decommissioning impasse: “The leadership of the IRA is
committed to a resolution of the issue of arms.  This will not be resolved until the
British Prime Minister takes political responsibility for it.”20  In the absence of any
IRA steps on decommissioning, the ruling council of the UUP is likely to meet later
in January, amid calls from agreement critics for Sinn Fein to be excluded from the
Executive or for a suspension of devolved government in Northern Ireland.21
Issues for the United States
The Clinton Administration and many Members of Congress actively support the
peace process.  They have sought to bolster peaceful elements through both
diplomacy and economic development.  The United States is home to over 40 million
Americans of Irish descent, and two groups have formed in Congress for Members
who are concerned about the situation in Northern Ireland — the Friends of Ireland,
and the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee For Irish Affairs.  George Mitchell, the
former Senate Majority Leader, whom President Clinton had appointed to be his
special advisor on Ireland, served as chairman of the multi-party peace talks that
resulted in the Good Friday Agreement and led the review of the peace agreement’s
implementation in the fall of 1999.  Foreign investment and the jobs such investment
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creates are seen as critical to tackling Northern Ireland’s unemployment and securing
peace, in the eyes of the Clinton Administration.  The United States is Northern
Ireland’s largest source of foreign investment with 59 U.S. companies employing
16,350 people.  Seeking to bolster the peace agreement, Bill Clinton has visited
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic three times as President, most recently on
December 12-13, 2000.22
Police Reform
An issue of particular interest to Congress in the implementation of the peace
agreement has been the reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern
Ireland’s police force.  The RUC  is 92% Protestant.  Long accused by human rights
organizations of brutality, Catholic leaders view the RUC as the enforcer of Protestant
domination and have called for it to be disbanded and replaced by a wholly new force.
Protestant leaders defend the RUC based on its tradition of loyalty and discipline, and
its record of fighting terrorism (more than 300 of its members have been killed in
action and thousands have been wounded and disabled).  As called for in the peace
agreement, an independent panel was created to make recommendations on new
policing arrangements by the summer of 1999.  The commission’s “proposals on
policing should be designed to ensure that policing arrangements, including
composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos and symbols, are such that in a new
approach Northern Ireland has a police service that can enjoy widespread support
from, and is seen as an integral part of, the community as a whole.”  Chris Patten, the
last British Governor of Hong Kong and former chairman of the Conservative Party,
was appointed by Prime Minister Blair to head the commission; seven other members
were named on June 3, 1998.
On April 22, 1999, the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) held
hearings on the RUC.  In Belfast on July 8, HIRC Chairman Benjamin Gilman
released a statement saying the hearing made clear the need for “root and branch”
reform of the RUC “at a minimum.”  Chairman Gilman provided a copy of the report
to the Patten Commission, together with a letter signed by several Members, including
the Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert, and the Democratic Leader, Richard
Gephardt.
The Patten Commission released its report on September 9, 1999.  The 128-page
report contained 175 recommendations and proposed the most radical reform of the
police force in the history of Northern Ireland.  It did not call for the RUC to be
disbanded, but recommended a new name — the Northern Ireland Police Service, a
new badge and symbols free of the British or Irish states; the Union flag should also
no longer be flown at police stations.  Other key proposals included a dramatic
reduction in the size of the force (reduce full-time service from 11,400 to 7,500), as
well as a substantial increase in the proportion of Catholic officers (increase to 16%
in four years and 30% in 10 years).23  Patten said a central aim of the report was to
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24 Frank Millar, “Key issues of police reform left unresolved,” The Irish Times, June 7,
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depoliticize the policing issue. Nonetheless, as expected, unionists responded
negatively; nationalists were generally positive.
On September 24, 1999, the House International Relations Committee’s
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights held a hearing on the
Patten Commission report.  The consolidated appropriations act for FY2000 (PL106-
113) prohibits further funding of any training or exchange program between the FBI
and the RUC, unless President Clinton certifies that RUC participants have been
vetted for past human rights abuses, and that the British and Irish governments “are
committed to assisting in the full implementation of the recommendations of the
Patten Commission.”
The Blair government presented the Police (Northern Ireland) Bill to the
House of Commons on May 16.  Northern Ireland Secretary Mandelson maintained
the bill was faithful to the “broad intentions” and “detailed recommendations” of the
Patten report, but the nationalist community criticized the bill severely.  On May 31,
Mandelson announced that Tom Constantine, former New York State police chief and
former head of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, had agreed to serve as
“Oversight Commissioner” to oversee the implementation of Patten.
On June 6, Secretary Mandelson published the implementation plan addressing
each of the 175 recommendations in the Patten report.  On the same day, in opening
the debate in the House of Commons as Members of Parliament gave the Police Bill
a Second Reading, Mandelson signaled likely concessions to Northern Ireland’s
Deputy First Minister, Seamus Mallon, on a range of issues of concern to nationalists.
Under growing pressure from the SDLP, as well as Sinn Fein and the Irish
government, Mandelson indicated likely amendments to the bill would deal with the
oath and code of ethics for members of the new police service, human rights training,
proposals for 50-50 recruitment, the role of the Oversight Commissioner and powers
of the Police Ombudsman, and the future functions of the District Police Partnership
Boards.  Contention continued over the title for the new police service, the emblems
or insignia to be associated with it, the flying of the Union flag over police stations,
and the power of the new Policing Board to order inquiries.24  In the U.S. Congress,
bills were introduced in both chambers (S.Res. 332 and H.Res. 547) calling on the
British government to “fully and faithfully implement the recommendations” of the
Patten report.
The controversial Police (Northern Ireland) Bill completed its parliamentary
passage at Westminster on November 21, 2000.  While some nationalist concerns
have been addressed and changes in the legislation made, the SDLP and Sinn Fein
contend that the new police force will not be sufficiently accountable.  British officials
disagree and argue that nationalists do not properly appreciate the unionist
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perspective on Patten.  Secretary Mandelson has said the British government hopes
to have a new Policing Board in place in January 2001, in shadow form, made up of
unionist, nationalist, and republican politicians.  In April 2001, advertisements will
appear for initial recruits, selected on a 50/50 basis from the Protestant and Catholic
communities.  In September 2001, those recruits would start training and the new
police service will come into being as the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
 
Chris Patten endorsed the government’s controversial reforms of the RUC on
November 28, a significant boost to Secretary of State Mandelson’s attempts to win
broad nationalist approval for the new policing dispensation.  Patten encouraged
nationalists and unionists to nominate representatives to the new Policing Board and
District Policing Partnerships.  He also said the political parties should encourage
young people from all sections of the community to join the police service created by
the British Government’s Police Bill.25
International Fund for Ireland
The International Fund for Ireland (IFI) is the conduit through which the U.S.
Government provides assistance to Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  It
was created in September 1986 by the British and Irish governments, based on
objectives stated in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.  The Fund supports economic
and social development projects in the areas most affected by the civil unrest in the
North, with roughly 75% of the Fund’s resources spent in Northern Ireland and the
remainder in border areas of the Republic.  Of the money allocated for Northern
Ireland, roughly 89% is spent in the most disadvantaged areas.  Many of the Fund’s
projects are focused on areas suffering from high unemployment, outward migration
of young people, lack of facilities, and little private sector investment.  The IFI
provides seed funding to stimulate private and public sector investment in those areas.
The Fund seeks to “encourage contact, dialogue and reconciliation between
nationalists and unionists throughout Ireland.”  Many observers highlight the Fund’s
reconciliation function as a key contribution to the peace process, as IFI projects have
been able to provide the incentive for divided communities to work together for the
common good.  The IFI has aided about 3,600 projects in the areas of tourism, urban
development, agriculture and rural development, technology, business and community
development.  As of September 1997, IFI-supported projects had created 31,629 jobs.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of September 19, 1986 (PL 99-415)
authorized U.S. contributions to the Fund.  Other donors include the European Union
(EU), Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.  Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland receive additional, substantial EU aid.  The United States is a major donor,
and has requested that its contribution be used primarily to stimulate private sector
investment and job creation.  For FY2000, President Clinton requested and Congress
approved $19.6 million for the IFI (PL106-113).  For FY2001, the Senate
Appropriations Committee did not identify specific funding for the IFI in the foreign
operations appropriation bill (S. 2522), but the positive language about the IFI in the
Committee’s report (106-291) of  May 11, 2000 suggested funding would be
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available within the worldwide economic support fund account, as requested by the
Administration.  The Senate passed S. 2522 on June 22.  The House Appropriations
Committee established a separate line item for the IFI and requested $25 million for
the Fund for FY2001, an increase of $5.4 million over the current funding level.
According to the Committee’s report (106-720), the recommended increase is “to
express support for implementation of the Good Friday Agreement.”  The House of
Representatives passed H.R. 4811 on July 13.  The two chambers worked out a
compromise on the final bill in conference.  President Clinton signed that bill into law
on November 6, 2000 (PL 106-429); it included $25 million for the IFI. 
Table 1.  U.S. Contributions to the IFI
(in millions of dollars)
FY1986 $50 FY1993 $19.7
FY1987 $35 FY1994 $19.6
FY1988 $35 FY1995 $19.6
FY1989 $10 FY1996 $19.6
FY1990 $20 FY1997 $19.6
FY1991 $20 FY1998 $19.6
FY1992 $19.7 FY1999 $19.6
FY2000 $19.6 FY2001 $25
Successive U.S. Administrations and the U.S. Congress have seen economic
development as key to fostering peace in Northern Ireland.  Support for the
paramilitaries has been strongest in the communities suffering the highest level of
unemployment and economic deprivation; thus, many see the creation of jobs and
economic opportunity as on par with working out a political solution to the conflict
in Northern Ireland.  Critics of U.S. assistance to the region argue that the European
Union, not the United States, is the appropriate source of aid and further that private
investment, rather than aid, is central to job creation.  Supporters of the aid program,
including many Members of Congress, see aid and investment as complementary, with
aid often serving as a catalyst for investment.
Fair Employment and MacBride
All major social and economic indicators show that Catholics in Northern
Ireland are disadvantaged relative to Protestants.  The most persistent area of
inequality has been employment.  Catholics experience rates of unemployment over
twice as high as Protestants, and Catholics are more likely than Protestants to
experience long-term unemployment.  The British government sees inward investment
and the creation of employment opportunities, linked to its fair employment
legislation, as the best antidote to Catholic unemployment.  Others believe
implementation of the MacBride Principles would provide an important remedy.
Introduced in 1984, the MacBride Principles are nine equal opportunity/affirmative
action principles, intended to promote employment options for members of
underrepresented religious groups in Northern Ireland.  Among other things, the
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Principles call for provocative religious or political emblems to be banned from the
workplace; for all job openings to be publicly advertised with special recruitment
efforts to attract applicants from underrepresented groups; and for adequate security
at the workplace.
Supporters have led a campaign to have observance of the MacBride
Principles by U.S. firms with plants in Northern Ireland made mandatory through
legislation enacted at the federal, state and city level.  Sixteen states and over 30 cities
have adopted legislation on the MacBride Principles.  Sinn Fein is the only party in
Northern Ireland which supports both the principles and the campaign.  Supporters
of the campaign believe their efforts were instrumental in bringing about British
passage of the 1989 Fair Employment Act.  The Clinton Administration believes the
principles are “highly commendable,” but has expressed concern about whether their
implementation might discourage investment.  None of the 59 U.S. companies with
operations in Northern Ireland has adopted the Principles explicitly, but about 44 U.S.
companies have come to an agreement, whereby they will make lawful efforts to
implement the fair employment standards embodied in the MacBride Principles.
In the 105th Congress, the omnibus fiscal 1999 appropriations bill, which
President Clinton signed into law (P.L. 105-277) on October 21, 1998, contains a
provision on the International Fund for Ireland providing monies to firms employing
practices consistent with “principles of economic justice” (modified MacBride
Principles).
Legislation in the 106th Congress
H.R. 128 (Engel)
A bill concerning paramilitary groups and British security forces in Northern
Ireland.  Introduced January 6, 1999; referred to Committee on International
Relations.
H.R. 1164 (McDermott)
A bill to provide for assistance by the United States to promote economic
growth and stabilization of Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Irish
Republic.  Introduced March 17, 1999; referred to Committees on International
Relations, and on Ways and Means.
H.R. 1166 (Meehan)
A bill to authorize the President to enter into a trade agreement concerning
Northern Ireland and certain border counties of the Republic of Ireland.  Introduced
March 17, 1999; referred to Committee on Ways and Means.
H.R. 1211 (Smith)
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2000.  Section 408 calls for a halt to
training programs between the FBI and the Royal Ulster Constabulary until certain
conditions have been met.  Introduced March 22, 1999; amended and reported out
by Committee on International Relations April 29.
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H.R. 2109 (Payne)
A bill to limit the sale or export of plastic bullets to the United Kingdom.
Introduced June 9, 1999.
H.R. 2110 (Payne)
A bill to provide for the waiver of certain grounds of inadmissibility related to
political activity in Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland for aliens married to
U.S. citizens.  Introduced June 9, 1999; referred to Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 3194/PL 106-113
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000.  Signed into law, November
29, 1999.  Includes $19.6 million for International Fund for Ireland (IFI).  Prohibits
further funding of any training or exchange program between the FBI and the Royal
Ulster Constabulary, unless certain conditions are met.
H.R. 4811 (Callahan)/PL 106-429
A bill to make appropriations for foreign operations, etc., for FY2001.  Signed
into law, November 6, 2000.  Includes $25 million for IFI.  The conference report
urges the application of equal opportunity principles through the IFI.
H.Con.Res. 54 (Crowley)
A concurrent resolution recognizing the historic significance of the first
anniversary of the Good Friday Peace Agreement.  Introduced March 11, 1999;
passed House April 20, 1999; referred to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
April 21, 1999.
H.Con.Res. 59 (Payne)
A concurrent resolution condemning the brutal killing of Rosemary Nelson.
Introduced March 17, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations.
H.Con.Res. 242 (Gejdenson)
To urge the Nobel Commission to award the year 2000 Nobel Prize for Peace
to former U.S. Senator George J. Mitchell for his dedication to fostering peace in
Northern Ireland. Introduced January 27, 2000.
H.Res. 128 (Smith)
A resolution condemning the murder of human rights lawyer Rosemary Nelson
and calling for the protection of defense attorneys in Northern Ireland.  Introduced
March 23, 1999; passed House April 20, 1999.
H.Res. 547 (Neal)
A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with
respect to the peace process in Northern Ireland and calling upon the British
Government to fully and faithfully implement the recommendations contained in the
Patten Commission report on policing.  Introduced July 11, 2000; passed House
September 26, 2000.
S.J. Res. 54 (Kennedy)
A joint resolution expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the
peace process in Northern Ireland.  Introduced September 28, 2000.  
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S.Res. 64 (Durbin)
A resolution recognizing the historic significance of the first anniversary of the
Good Friday Peace Agreement.  Introduced and passed Senate March 17, 1999.
S.Res. 259 (Helms)
A resolution urging the decommissioning of arms and explosives in Northern
Ireland.  Introduced February 24, 2000 and referred to Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. 
S.Res. 332 (Kennedy)
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the peace
process in Northern Ireland and calling upon the British Government to fully and
faithfully implement the recommendations contained in the Patten Commission report
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